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Abstract In this work it is pointed out that some physical theories, even being
themselves falsifiable, predict the existence of regions of spacetime which are
not falsifiable with relation to each other due to their impossibility of mutually
exchanging information as, for instance, before and after the event horizon
of black holes. If we require scientific theories to be falsifiable, an isolated
region should be discarded from scientific models developed by observers in
other regions. Here it is proposed that their existence can satisfy a weaker
falsifiability condition, here called conditional asymptotic provability, which
extend scientific reasoning through Bayesian inference. Limitations and some
epistemic consequences of this proposal are discussed.
1 Introduction
The existence of alternate realities or parallel universes in addition to our own
is a classic problem both in physics and philosophy. It can be traced back
to the dialogues of Plato[30] in which he stated that all possibilities should
be actualised in the universe, what later became known as the principle of
plenitude and was restated with variations by several different philosophers.
For instance, modal realism [27] suggests that every possible world – another
term used to denote these alternate realities – exists independently of any
requirements in terms of physical laws. Such a proposal, however, exchanges
the question of ‘existence’ by that of ‘actuality’ without clearly defining the
two terms. Although modal realism claims that all worlds somehow exist, they
are actual only relative to other entities belonging to the same world, which
are called worldmates. This proposal literally suggests that all Shakespeare’s
characters are actual in their own worlds, but the meaning of ‘actual’ remains
elusive.
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If one considers modal realism and similar proposals as hypotheses about
the natural world, there are some important formal issues that need to be
addressed. In particular, it is of fundamental importance to find a precise
meaning for the term ‘possible worlds’ and characterise more precisely the
meaning of ‘to exist’ and ’to be actual’. At the bare minimum, the limitations
of these concepts relative to physical theories should be understood. These
are not trivial questions. For instance, the original version of modal realism
suggests that possible worlds should be considered to be generated by a re-
combination principle which, however, becomes equivalent to restating that
everything is possible. Attempts to constrain the possibilities become too arti-
ficial in the proposed framework as they are based on the exclusion of certain
sets of worlds from it, defeating the spirit of the original idea. Philosophically,
this issue seems far from being settled [34].
The problem is particularly relevant in modern physics, where parallel uni-
verses appear in many different guises [39]. The ensemble formed by all these
universes within a certain framework is known as the multiverse, although the
way this term is used may vary widely [5]. But the idea of parallel universes
in physics precedes these relatively recent studies, being for instance the foun-
dation of Everett’s many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics [15,3].
Although older than modal realism, the many-worlds interpretation suggests a
similar scenario, but restricts the set of possible worlds to histories of systems
which forcibly obey the basic laws of quantum mechanics.
A more ambitious idea proposed by Tegmark [38,40] and named the math-
ematical universe is a version of modal realism which is less restrictive than
many-worlds. It suggests that every mathematical structure can be considered
to have physical existence and, therefore, all universes modelled after these
structures also do. Given its close relation to modal realism, we call this pro-
posal mathematical realism. It is argued that mathematical realism trivially
explains Wigner’s famous observation about the “unreasonable effectiveness
of mathematics in the natural sciences” [42]. According to it, there is no mys-
tery in the fact that the universe can be described by mathematical models
with unbelievable precision because every universe that can be described this
way is ultimately bound to exist. The possible existence of non-mathematical
universes seems to be outside the scope of the proposal.
Both many worlds and mathematical realism suffer from the same problem
of defining the meaning of ‘to exist’. The concept of ‘absolute existence’ has
yet to be formulated in a totally satisfactory and uncontroversial way, not
only in physics but also in philosophy [28,33]. This work has no intention of
contributing to that particular line of research. In order to make progress in
our intended direction, we take the pragmatic position that, although there
is still no such definition available, the concept of absolute existence has a
meaning which coincides, when appropriate, with our physical intuition about
it.
Another topic to which we shall not contribute is choosing whether either
modal or mathematical realism is better. We assume that it is an experimental
fact that mathematical models used by physics can approximate reality and
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restrict our analysis to them from here on. Combining our two aforementioned
assumptions, it should be possible in principle to define a binary operator in
every physical model which acts on every object O of the theory (particle,
field, system etc.) in such a way that E(O) = 1 means that O exists (in the
absolute sense of the previous paragraph) as a physical entity and E(O) = 0
that it does not. An actual proof of this possibility is elusive though.
The concept of existence is closely related to the question of whether or not
a physical theory is a correct description of nature. Although mathematical
realism would imply that all mathematical theories are correct because the
mathematical models represented by them do exist, we know by experience
that not all of them describe our reality. Some consistent mathematical de-
scriptions will give wrong answers to the results of experiments and therefore
should be discarded. If one could prove that a physical theory is correct be-
yond doubt, there would be a chance that its component objects indeed exist
in an absolute sense.
There are two problems with this reasoning. First, the number of possible
hypotheses about the physical world is too large. A more realistic objective
would be to identify a subset formed by those which have a possibility of
being validated. This is known as the delimitation problem and has a key role
in separating science from superstition. One of the difficulties faced by this task
is that, to the extent of which time has no future boundary, it is impossible
to prove that a theory is right. No matter the amount of supporting evidence
accumulated by a theory up to some point, there is no possible proof that
it will work even in the following instant. One solution for the delimitation
problem was proposed by Popper in 1934 [31] and relies on a very precise
property of hypotheses called falsifiability. Whether or not this is a definitive
solution is still a source of controversy [13].
A hypothesis is falsifiable if there is an experiment (which is realisable in
principle, but might not be in practice) for which one of its possible results
will rule out the hypothesis with certainty. If this condition is not satisfied,
it means that the hypothesis has no actual prediction about any conceivable
experiment. In other words, every measurement is trivially consistent with the
hypothesis – the truth value of the hypothesis has no actual consequences in
the physical world (although it might have psychological ones).
The above line of reasoning led Popper to argue that falsifiability should
be the main property of scientific theories. If absolute existence as mentioned
before can be actually defined, models which are not falsifiable cannot make
non-trivial predictions, having no observational consequences even if the reality
they describe exists. Intuitively, in order for a hypothesis to be falsifiable,
a good degree of precision in its formulation becomes necessary. Scientific
models (in particular, from physics) are hypotheses usually built on rigorous
mathematical structures and therefore more probable to be falsifiable. Still,
not all scientific hypotheses being currently studied are known to be falsifiable
(for instance, string theory [43]). There is nothing wrong with that, but once
the theory is proved to be not falsifiable, common sense suggests it should be
better to discard it from our attempt to describe nature rationally.
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Let us now state the main problem identified in this work: if we assume
that the concept of absolute existence is meaningful, it is possible that different
regions of spacetime which are not falsifiable with respect to each other exist.
However if two regions M1 and M2 exist, but the existence of M2 cannot
be falsified by M1 (or vice-versa), science constrained by falsifiability cannot
assess it. In fact, the existence of M2 from the point of view of M1 becomes
pure philosophical speculation. We reach the very awkward situation in which,
although both regions do exist, it is not rational for observers in M1 to say
that M2 does. We call it the isolated regions problem.
The above question has been raised in the context of multiverse theories
before, but in a different way. While most discussions focus on whether or
not the models are valid as scientific hypothesis [6], we start by assuming the
existence of isolated regions and propose a (partial) solution for the problem.
We will return to this point in more details later on.
Because falsifiability relies on the possibility of an observer measuring the
results of experiments, it requires the exchange of information between the ob-
server and the experiment. This means that information should be able to flow
from the spacetime location of the experimental set up to that of the observer.
We identify here some physical models in which this indeed happens – there
are predicted regions which cannot exchange information between themselves.
Here, we propose a partial solution to this problem – to include in the scope
of science a different class of theories which cannot be proven to be wrong, but
whose probability of being wrong can be continually assessed and re-evaluated.
In this way, although the existence of M2 to M1 still cannot be falsified, one
can make some quantitative objective assessment of the probability that its
existence is true.
The restrictive nature of falsifiability is due to the fact that it is binary
concept – a hypothesis is or is not falsifiable, two mutually exclusive possibil-
ities. Our proposal introduces an alternative point of view – that if we accept
the limitation of not knowing for certain whether a theory is also wrong, a
probabilistic relaxation of this condition allows the definition of a concept we
call conditional asymptotic provability (CAP). The truth value of hypothe-
ses satisfying CAP can then be continuously assessed in face of experimental
evidence through Bayesian inference methods.
Under certain conditions, we will show that isolated regions of spacetime
might obey CAP implying that, by using Bayesian inference one can gradu-
ally increase the confidence in their existence from another region. Under this
framework, hypotheses which are not falsifiable obviously remain so, but one
can nevertheless asses their level of confidence adding a new epistemic level to
the delimitation problem and extending the scope of scientific inquiry.
The rest of this paper, which is intended to formally specify the general
problem and its proposed resolution, is structured as follows. In section 2 we
give a more detailed definition of what is an isolated spacetime region. Section
3 formalise the concept of falsifiability in probabilistic terms. Two conditions
are then proposed to classify hypotheses as falsifiable and the consequences of
them are worked out. Then, in section ?? we introduce the idea of conditional
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Fig. 1 Representation of the falsifiability relations between entities as a directed graph.
Directed (red) edges represent the direction of information flow while non-directed (black)
edges represent flow in both directions.
asymptotic provability and analyse the conditions under which it can occur.
The final section of this work is dedicated to a summary of the results and
additional discussions.
2 Isolated Regions
Consider two existing physical entities A and B, i.e. E(A) = E(B) = 1,
for which it is impossible to exchange information either directly or indirectly,
where information is to be understood in the sense of Shannon [10]. Physically,
information can be exchanged if there is a possibility of interaction between
two entities, mediated or not by a third one. For instance, interactions between
elementary fermions are always mediated by bosons.
When even indirect interaction is not possible, one entity cannot falsify
the existence of the other. In this case, either A is not falsifiable to B (but
B is to A), B is not falsifiable to A (but A is to B) or both are mutually
not falsifiable. Notice that the possibility that information can flow in only
one way, for instance, from A to B but not from B to A is left open. If A is
falsifiable to B, but B is not to A, we write A→ B or equivalentlyB ← A. This
notation intends to convey the idea that information can flow in the direction
of the arrows. When information can flow both ways, we say that the entities
are mutually falsifiable and write A ↔ B. Entities are clearly falsifiable to
themselves, i.e., A ↔ A for every entity such that E(A) = 1. If information
cannot flow either way and entities are not falsifiable to each other, we write
A ‖ B and say that they are isolated from each other.
One can represent the above relations between entities in a given patch of
spacetime by a directed graph in which each entity is represented by a vertex.
An arrow from vertex A to vertex B indicates that information can flow from
A to B, but not in the opposite direction. When information flows both ways,
we indicate it by an undirected edge for simplicity. Fig. 1 shows an example
of this kind of graph.
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Notice the presence of a boundary between two sets of vertices – hollow
and full – formed by all the directed edges. We will call this boundary an
information horizon. Information can flow from any vertex to the full vertices,
but cannot flow from full vertices to hollow ones. Inside each set of vertices,
existence is falsifiable. This is not true in general for the different sets. Sets of
vertices which are mutually not falsifiable would correspond to disconnected
pieces of a graph. One can now recognise fig. 1 as a discretised toy model
for a neighbourhood of a classical Schwarzschild black hole. The information
horizon represents the event horizon, the hollow vertices the exterior of the
black hole and the full vertices its interior.
We now claim that falsifiability only makes sense in the relative way defined
above. Suppose we could say that an entity A is falsifiable in an absolute sense.
The only non-relative meaning for this is if A is falsifiable to every other
existing entity. Therefore, if there is one entity that cannot falsify A, absolute
falsifiability makes no sense. But the same is true for every other existing
entity, implying that every pair of entities are mutually falsifiable. This means
that absolute falsifiability only makes sense if every entity is falsifiable to
every other entity. However, we will soon show examples where this is not
true. Therefore, absolute falsifiability cannot exist.
Because all physical entities will exist in a certain spacetime region, and
even spacetime itself can be seen as a physical entity, we can actually associate
regions of spacetime to sets of entities. Let us consider two such regions M1
and M2. We say that M1 → M2 if there is at least one entity in M1 which
is falsifiable to at least one entity in M2. Because all entities inside a certain
region are mutually falsifiable, the flow information implies that, every entity
in M1 is falsifiable by every entity in M2 therefore. This allows us to unam-
biguously define the relation M1 →M2, i.e., region M1 is falsifiable to region
M2.
We can now justify our use of exchange of (Shannon) information to define
falsifiability. The objective is to avoid any ambiguities originating from enti-
ties connected by entanglement which, although representing non-local corre-
lations, will not allow any information to be transmitted unless it is mediated
locally by one of the four known physical interactions [17]. If two entangled
particles somehow end up finding themselves in two regions which are not
mutually falsifiable, one can still be considered to be non-falsifiable to the
other. Whether or not the existence of non-local quantum correlations would
make falsification possible is not clear at the moment and will not be further
discussed here.
Each separate world from modal realism, can be associated to an isolated
region and the concept of worldmates to that of mutually falsifiability. The
same is trur for the the parallel universes in Everett’s many-worlds interpre-
tation and the realities in Tegmark’s mathematical realism. But these are not
the only examples one can find.
Some actual physical models inspired by string theories propose that our
observable universe is a lower dimensional object, called a “brane”, embedded
in a higher dimensional structure that can be occupied by other similar objects
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(e.g., brane-world scenario [32] or ekpyrotic universe[25]). In all these models,
however, branes are obliged to interact via gravity and can therefore exchange
information, not corresponding to the kind of isolation we are concerned with.
The possibility of two isolated branes which do not interact at all cannot be
however discarded in principle.
Eternal inflation models [18] predict the existence of pocket universes, sepa-
rate regions of spacetime originated from the inflation of a false vacuum which
had never interacted with our universe and, in some cases, are predicted to
never interact. Another example is the baby universes originated from classi-
cal black hole solutions [21], in which the topology of spacetime changes as a
region detaches itself completely from the original manifold and might never
be reunited with it again.
Whether or not the above models are falsifiable themselves is not known. A
more striking scenario comes from one of our most well-tested physical theories
– General Relativity (GR). The mathematical structure of GR is consistent
and it is generally uncontroversial that it is a falsifiable theory in the sense
that it makes falsifiable predictions. In fact, so many of these predictions have
been confirmed that our belief that GR is correct as a good approximation for
our world given our experimental precision is extremely high.
However, using the framework we developed above, we now show that there
are regions of spacetime predicted to exist by GR which are not falsifiable
relative to others. One example is the Schwarzschild black hole as suggested
above. As mentioned, as far as we know, an observer located behind the event
horizon can receive information from the outside, but no information can go
back once it has crossed the horizon [8].
This situation divides the spacetime in the regions before and after the
horizon, which we call respectively O and I with O → I – although O is
falsifiable to I, O is not falsifiable to I. Entities in I can record the results of
experiments in O by receiving, for instance, light signals from it, but entities
in O cannot do any measurements of entities in I. The unavoidable conclusion
is that, whatever predictions GR does about I, they are not falsifiable.
One possible argument against the above observation is that, if the black
hole has its origins in the collapse of a star, the region that becomes gradu-
ally engulfed by the horizon existed before and there is no evidence that the
formation of the horizon would destroy it. The argument works for any causal
horizon. Because the receding speeds due to the expansion of the universe are
not constrained by the speed of light, two regions in causal contact at the
present might become isolated from each other in the future. While previous
contact might be evidence for mutual existence, two regions that start their
existence already at points that are receding at speeds exceeding that of the
light from each other will not be able to exchange information at any time in
the future. In this case an additional argument of symmetry could be raised.
If there is nothing special about any of the regions relative to the other, why
should one stop existing and the other not?
On the other hand, although one might argue that the branching or merging
of regions would be enough to assert their possible existence after they become
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isolated, that is not correct. Whatever processes separate the regions, from the
point of view of the other they still need to be falsifiable. That is because the
number of hypotheses that can be raised to explain the existence or lack of
existence of the other region is infinite. In the example of the expansion of the
universe, one can always postulate that a random quantum fluctuation will
destroy one of the other regions and those asking the questions are the lucky
remaining ones, a version of the anthropic principle.
Likewise, for the case of a black hole, an alternative theory is that the hori-
zon simply works as a limit to the spacetime and everything that “crosses”
it stops existing. Alternatively, one could sew beyond the horizon any kind of
parallel universe. That would not affect GR outside the black hole as it would
not have any measurable effects. Something similar has been proposed under
the name of firewall hypothesis concerning what happens with an observer
when passing through the horizon of a black hole. While classically it seems
that nothing would happen, quantum effects put in doubt the survival of a
diving observer, which might be incinerated during the crossing [1], and actu-
ally the very existence of spacetime beyond it. Susskind have strongly argued
against it [37], but under the strict umbrella of falsifiability, the discussion has
only philosophical value.
But Susskind’s position, shared by several others, resonates with many of
us for a series of reasons. All of them comes from our intuition born from
experience with other physical theories where extreme events like a piece of
spacetime being erased do not happen. Most of our theories rely on smooth
changes at borders, on symmetry arguments and so on. Still, all of them have
no fundamental precedence over observation and, therefore, do not preclude
falsifiability. The fact that such characteristics have been observed to be true
time and over again cannot guarantee that they will always be true, but each
time they happen we do have the right to be more confident about it. Why we
have this right is a question of probabilistic inference, more precisely Bayesian
inference. In this way, our suggestion is natural – let us use this right and,
aware of its limitations, include probabilistic inference in our epistemological
arsenal to explore the physical world.
3 Falsifiability
Because our argument is based on Bayesian inference, we need to know how
to express falsifiability in these terms. Consider a certain hypothesis H whose
truth we want to evaluate in face of some acquired data D. More than often,
this evaluation has to be probabilistic because not every dataset D will be
enough to decide without any doubt. In the Bayesian framework, we say that
we want to evaluate the posterior probability ofH being true after we acquired
the dataset D. For this, we use the shorthand conditional notation P(H |D)
(probability of H given D). Because this is a conditional probability, we can
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use Bayes’ theorem to write
P(H |D) =
P(D|H)P(H)∑
H
P(D|H)P(H)
, (1)
where the sum over H ∈ {F, T }, F meaning false and T meaning true, is just
a normalisation constant and can be omitted whenever only the relative value
of H being true or false is important.
This is usually how Bayesian inference is justified in general. The proba-
bility P(H) is called the prior probability of H and is supposed to encode all
previous information that would allow us to make an educated guess about
the validity of H before including D, creating a bias on the H truth value.
Bayesian inference can revert the bias in case new data provides enough evi-
dence for it. If we cannot guess any result beforehand, we simply start with
equal odds to both possibilities. The probability P(D|H) is called the likeli-
hood of H given D and encodes a model of the measurement that needs to
accompany the hypothesis. Without this model, there is no way to connect the
dataset to it. The confuse nomenclature of the likelihood, which one would ex-
pect to be of D given H , is a quirk from its origins in statistics. That is why,
most of the time, we say only likelihood or simply the probability of D given
H . In this way, we can update our prior estimate on the validity of H after
acquiring D. Except that, at this point, this is not exactly true.
The reason is that Bayes’ theorem comes straight from the definition of
conditional probabilities and has no time sense embedded in it, while Bayesian
inference does. If one wants to use it as an update equation, it is necessary to
prove that the probability on the left hand side refers to a time after the one
in which we estimated P(H). This very subtle point is well discussed in [7].
Luckily, the final result is formally the same and we can forget about these
details most of the time.
There is strong evidence that the formal framework of science should in-
clude Bayesian inference [2,24,20,22] as long as its limitations are taken into
account [12,13], although there is still some discussion about the details of
how this can be accomplished [19]. It can be shown that Bayes’ rule itself is
a consequence of the more fundamental Principle of Maximum Entropy [7],
a generalisation of Laplace’s Principle of Insufficient Reason, which is noth-
ing but the statement that the objective of rational inference is to extract
information from a dataset with the least degree of bias.
Within the Bayesian framework, probabilities always encode the current
state of knowledge about some hypothesis once all the available data (until
that moment) have been taken into consideration. Whether or not the propo-
sition is falsifiable does not preclude this attribution. For instance, solipsism,
the doctrine that only your mind exists and nothing else, is fundamentally not
falsifiable. Still, there is nothing that forbids attributing a probability for it
being true or false. Another hypothesis which is not strictly falsifiable is fine-
tuning, which also can be analysed using Bayesian/probabilistic methods [41].
The possibility of attaching probabilities to hypothesis which are not falsifi-
able is nothing magical, only a consequence of the fact that Bayesian inference
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encodes formal rules of reasoning for general hypotheses. But exactly because
of that, it can be seen as a consistent mathematical framework which can be
used to extend the limits of rational thought and allow for rational mathemat-
ical consideration of hypotheses which are usually in the realm of philosophy
but not of science.
Let us see then, how falsifiability can be expressed in probabilistic terms
and what are the consequences of using Bayesian inference together with it.
Suppose, once again, that we have a certain hypotheses H and we are inter-
ested in validating it experimentally. Informally, H is falsifiable if it makes
some prediction that can (in principle, maybe not in practice) be checked un-
ambiguously if it is right or wrong. This means that it should exist at least
one experiment E admitting at least one result which, if measured, can un-
ambiguously confirm that H is false, but not necessarily whether it is true.
For instance, mechanical energy conservation for translation invariant systems
is a prediction of Newtonian physics. Confirming it in one experiment does
not confirm the truth of Newtonian physics, but (unambiguously) measuring
a failure of it would mean that it is false.
By an abuse of notation, we will attribute a binary value to the variable H
which will stand for the truth value of the hypothesis. If H = T the hypothesis
is true, if H = F , it is false. If H makes a falsifiable prediction, this means that
we can separate all possible measurements of E in two groups which we call A
and B. If H predicts B, this means that if H is true, B is the only possible
result of the measurement. Alternatively,a result A cannot be obtained if H
is true. This can be written as the following condition on the probability of a
measurement of E given H (the likelihood factor)
P(E = A|H = T ) = 0, (2)
where we are again abusing the notation to attribute a binary value to E . By
Bayes’ rule, this directly implies that P(H = T |E = A) = 0, or that if the
result A is obtained, the probability that the theory is true is zero. However, if
the measurement falls on group B, it does not mean that the theory has been
proved true. This is the subtle point that makes falsifiability a strong idea
in science. Because one can never exhaust all possible measurements, there is
always the possibility that, the next time, the theory will be proven wrong.
There is another condition that we require for a hypothesis to be falsifiable.
If the result A can never be obtained, then the experiment E is meaningless
as a way to falsify H . This leads to another condition on the likelihood
P(E = A|H = F ) 6= 0. (3)
Let us call equations (2) and (3) respectively the first and second falsifia-
bility conditions. They are all that is required to say that the experiment E
falsifies H . If there is not such an experiment, H is not falsifiable. The question
now is whether we can say anything about the probability of H being true if
we measure B.
In order to save space in the expressions that follow, we will use a subindex
to specify the random variables of the probability distributions and use as
Falsifiability of Isolated Spacetime Regions 11
argument their values when convenient. For instance, the two falsifiability
conditions become
PE|H(A|T ) = 0, PE|H(A|F ) 6= 0. (4)
Then, using Bayes’ rule, we can write
PH|E(T |B) =
PE|H(B|T )PH(T )
PE|H(B|F )PH(F ) + PE|H(B|T )PH(T )
. (5)
Because PE|H(A|h) + PE|H(B|h) = 1, ∀h ∈ {F, T }, the first falsifiability
condition implies PE|H(B|T ) = 1, while the second one gives PE|H(B|F ) < 1.
We then can rewrite it as
PH|E(T |B) =
PH(T )
PE|H(B|F )(1− PH(T )) + PH(T )
. (6)
Now, if we can guarantee that the above denominator is less than one,
this would mean that PH|E(T |B) > PH(T ) and a measurement of B would
increase the probability that H is true. This happens when
PE|H(B|F )(1− PH(T )) + PH(T ) < 1⇒ PE|H(B|F ) < 1, (7)
which we already derived as a consequence of the second condition. It is also
possible to find the rate at which PH|E(T |B) increases, the explicit calculation
of which we leave to appendix A.
The result confirm the fact that, if a hypothesis is falsifiable by an exper-
iment, by confirming its prediction on that experiment one gains confidence
in the theory. The formal proof given above shows that Bayesian inference
confirms our intuition in this case. Although H can never be confirmed, we
will say that H is asymptotically provable in this case.
There are two points that need to be highlighted. The first is that, once a
hypothesis has been falsified, it is ruled out for good. Bayes’ rule implies that,
if the prior for a result is zero, no amount of additional evidence can change
it. The second concerns actual experiments. The above proof is based on the
fact that the obtained measurements are trustworthy, which is rarely the case
in practice. In a real situation, noise is usually present. This should be taken
into consideration and, if done correctly, will change the equations above. This
however will not be discussed further here. For our purposes, it is enough that
the fundamental result stands in principle.
4 Conditional Asymptotic Provability
If the first condition on falsifiability is not met, the previous results are not
valid and the hypothesis cannot be falsified. In particular, the following ratio
PH|E(T |A)
PH|E(F |A)
=
PE|H(A|T )PH(T )
PE|H(A|F )PH(F )
, (8)
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will now depend on the precise value of the factor φ ≡ PE|H(A|T )/PE|H(A|F ).
When the experiment could falsify the hypothesis, the precise value of the
probability PE|H(A|F ) was not necessary, as long as it was not zero, because
φ would be automatically zero. This is not true anymore. To know whether
the above ratio increases or decreases with measurements, we need to know
whether φ > 1 or φ < 1. However, unless we know all possible alternative
hypotheses to H , this cannot be known. Therefore, if the hypothesis is not
falsifiable by the experiment, the measurements will only be able to rank a set
of competing hypotheses hi, i = 1, 2, ..., for which PE|H(A|hi) is known.
An alternative way to make possible attributing a numerical value to φ
has been suggested by Dawid [12,13]. Instead of providing a list of alterna-
tive hypotheses, he suggests to restrict the scope of the original hypothesis
by analysing its truth for a certain domain which he calls an empirical hori-
zon. The empirical horizon effectively restricts the possible experiments to the
extent that φ can be calculated.
For our purposes, it will be enough to assume that attributing a value to φ
is possible in principle, but it might not be accessible to to us. This is because
we are interested in a non-constructive proof of the possibility of falsification
and its variations, but not on the specific problem of attributing numerical
values for the confidence in the hypotheses. The latter is a problem that has
no general solution as discussed by Dawid in the references cited above. Notice
that impossibility of knowing the value φ does not preclude the asymptotic
provability of falsifiable hypotheses, but it does forbid us of exactly quantifying
the odds of it being true against being false and the same observations hold
in this case too.
Let us suppose now that there is another hypothesis G which is falsifiable
by an experiment E . Let us revert for a moment to the probability notation
without subindices for convenience. If we can relate the truth of G to that of
H by means of the conditional probability P(H |G), then we would be able to
write
P(H |E) =
∑
G
P(H,G|E)
=
∑
G
P(H |G, E)P(G|E)
=
∑
G
P(H |G)P(G|E),
(9)
where we assumed that E has no direct influence on H except through G. Back
to subindex notation, let us define the PH|G(T |T ) = p and PH|G(T |F ) = q
and write
PH|E(T |x) = pPG|E(T |x) + qPG|E(F |x), x ∈ {A,B}. (10)
An additional requirement is that p 6= q, otherwise H is independent of G.
In order to make the arguments clear, let us connect the following reasoning
to the case of the interior and exterior regions of a black hole. Previously, we
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used O to denote the region outside the black hole (before the horizon) and
I to denote its interior (after the horizon) and we wrote O → I to symbolise
that information can flow from O to I but not the opposite. The hypothesis
we would like to assess, which however is not falsifiable, is the existence of the
region I, i.e. H = T if E(I) = 1 and H = F if E(I) = 0. What we need then
is to find a suitable hypothesis G on which we can condition H .
There is a widespread belief that nature is not a patchwork, in the sense
that observations seem to show that physical theories either remain the same or
change smoothly when transitioning from one region of space to the other. It is
possible that the universe is composed of different phases separated by domain
walls [14], but even though there are underlying physical principles that are
assumed to be valid in all regions. More radical hypotheses where domains
have random physical laws [36] are very controversial, especially because there
is no way to assess them even probabilistically at the moment.
Let us call the property that nature is not a patchwork of theories the-
oretical continuity (TC) and use it as our conditioning hypothesis G. TC is
falsifiable as it makes a precise prediction which can, in principle, be tested.
Most cases of isolated regions in cosmology can be conditioned on this prop-
erty. There is at present no indication that different patches of our universe
sustain different physical laws, but measurements in principle could prove it
to be wrong.
If the experiment E can falsify G, then (using our previous notation) mea-
suring a value A implies that G is false and, therefore
PH|E(T |A) = q. (11)
If q = 0, then a measurement of A also means that H is false. In other
words, H can be falsified if the result is A. There is a subtlety though,
PH|G(T |F ) = 0 is equivalent to the logical statement G = F =⇒ H = F ,
which means that H = T =⇒ G = T . However, this last statement does
not correspond to the situation we are trying to model. For our example, this
would mean that the existence of region I would necessarily imply that conti-
nuity is true everywhere in the universe, which does not need to be the case.
In fact, if continuity is not true, one can easily have a situation in which I
exists.
If q 6= 0 though, H cannot be directly falsified by measuring A. Let us then
consider the ratio
PH|E(T |B)
PH|E(F |B)
=
pPG|E(T |B) + qPG|E(F |B)
(1− p)PG|E(T |B) + (1 − q)PG|E(F |B)
, (12)
which we can write in terms of γ ≡ PG|E(T |B)/PG|E(F |B) as
PH|E(T |B)
PH|E(F |B)
=
pγ + q
(1 − p)γ + (1− q)
. (13)
From our previous results on falsifiability, we know that if G is falsifiable,
then the ratio γ increases monotonically if we keep measuring only B. If this
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happens, the above ratio has three asymptotic limits. The first case is p = 0,
which leads to zero. This case, however, is equivalent to the one with q = 0
if, instead of G, we condition all probabilities on the hypothesis G′ = ¬G, the
negation of G. This transformation also makes unnecessary to consider the
case q = 1 and we can assume q 6= 1 as well.
The second case is when p 6= 1, which leads to p/(1 − p) and means that
the hypothesis H cannot be proved or disproved even asymptotically. Some
probabilistic assessment can be made, but there is a fundamental limit to the
uncertainty about H which cannot be surpassed. Because there is still some
probabilistic assessment that can be done using Bayesian inference, we will
say that in this case the hypothesis is Bayesian accessible.
The most interesting case is when p = 1. Then, the ratio grows indefinitely
with γ, which means that H becomes conditionally asymptotically provable.
It is only in this case that the possibility of validating H asymptotically given
the falsifiable condition G exists. For the case of the black hole, this would
mean that the existence of I would be asymptotically provable only in the
case that TC implies it. In practice, that is what is usually done without the
present formal justification.
5 Conditioning Properties
For the black hole case, we suggested that theoretical continuity is the prop-
erty that should be used to condition the existence of the spacetime region I
such that O can assess it rationally. It is also the condition that one would
naturally use in the case of cosmological horizons caused by the expansion of
the universe, the branching out of baby universes or Rindler horizons. For all
this cases, we are usually reluctant to accept that the spacetime beyond the
horizon has been destroyed by the phenomenon that created it. In the case
of the Rindler horizon, in particular, the process is reversible and it seems
unreasonable to assume that the spacetime was destroyed by acceleration and
then re-created by deceleration. Rigorously, that remains a possibility though,
as improbable as it might seem.
TC however would not be so straightforwardly justifiable in the case when
pocket universes appearing independently as in eternal inflation and similar
proposals. If the isolated regions haven’t been in contact at any time in the
past, TC alone is not an appealing property to attribute to physical theories
in both regions. A more general property would be desirable.
Another possible candidate for a falsifiable property on which others could
be conditioned would be mathematical consistency. A mathematically rigorous
definition of consistency is tricky [9], but roughly speaking, one usually requires
at least two features from it. The first is that one cannot prove at the same
time a proposition and its negation to be true. Some care must be taken
when constructing the propositions and how truth values are attributed to it
though. The second, more appropriate to our beliefs about nature, is that if a
prediction is derived by a theory using one method, the same result should be
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obtained by using any alternative methods allowed by that theory. As a certain
result can always be reformulated as a yes/no question, the two definitions are
equivalent.
Scientific models are constructed by using mathematical structures with
well defined sets of axioms. Therefore, a mathematical inconsistency on the
latter would result in an inconsistency of the former. The belief in the con-
sistency of physical laws comes from the observational fact that it seems to
hold in all natural phenomena ever studied. This belief is so strong that the
apparent mathematical inconsistency between GR and quantum field theory
under certain extreme conditions is one of the driving forces in the pursuit of
a theory of quantum gravity [26]. It is worth noticing that, on philosophical
grounds, the debate on whether consistency is necessary is still open [16,11,
35], but the great majority of scientists view inconsistencies as flaws in the
models, although it would not prevent their use in practice if a better theory
is lacking.
The modern theoretical position, again based on observations of nature up
to this day, is that a mathematically inconsistent theory should be considered
wrong from start, even though it might be successful in a limited way. How-
ever, the consistency criteria itself, although falsifiable and apparently highly
probable, can never be proved to be correct in an absolute sense, unless in the
special case in which all possible experiments have already been done.
The list of possible properties does not end here. Symmetries and conser-
vation laws are other possibilities. Notice that they also depend on the math-
ematical consistency of a theory, which creates a tree of dependencies. The
best possible scenario would be to identify a minimal set of falsifiable prop-
erties, particularly for the case of fundamental theories. Recently, there has
been a discussion about extra-empirical properties as guides to fundamental
theories [29]. Falsifiability itself falls into this category together with natural-
ness, simplicity and elegance. Excluding falsifiability itself, whether or not a
correct description of nature depends on these properties might make some of
them falsifiable, while others not. An in depth analysis of their classification
and how they are interrelated however is a complex subject and left for future
work.
Conditioning as proposed here is closely related to one of Dawid’s non-
empirical confirmation arguments, the Meta-Inductive Argument [13]. His
meta-level hypotheses are equivalent to our conditioning ones, with the dif-
ference that we however only consider conditioning hypotheses which can be
empirically assessed.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
To summarise the work presented in here, we first pointed out that several
theories of modern physics predict the existence of regions of spacetime which
cannot exchange information with others. Although most of these theories are
only tentative at the present, there is at least one well-tested falsifiable theory
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among them – general relativity. If one region M1 cannot receive information
from anotherM2, the existence of the latter cannot be falsified by any observer
in the former. By assuming that a concept of absolute existence makes sense
in nature, we arrived at what we called the isolated regions problem: although
M2 exists, if its existence cannot be falsified by observers inM1, strictly speak-
ing M2 cannot be scientifically assessed from M1 and, ideally, should not be
considered a scientific hypothesis in the latter.
The solution we proposed for this conundrum is that probabilistic inference
methods can extend the area of the hypothesis space which can be rationally
assessed to include hypotheses which are, strictly speaking, not falsifiable. In
order to do that, we introduced two sufficient conditions for a certain hy-
pothesis to be falsifiable in probabilistic terms. We also prove that falsifiable
hypotheses obeying these conditions can be asymptotically proved, i.e., each
time their predictions are confirmed, the probability that they are true in-
creases with a limit valued proved to be 1. We then suggested to use a falsifi-
able physical property G to condition the existence of a hypothesis H which
is not falsifiable, deriving an equation for the change in the ration between
the posteriors of H being true or false. Although the formalism shows that
H cannot be falsifiable even conditionally, we could demonstrate that one can
still make probabilistic statements about H . In particular, we show that if
PH|G(T |T ) = 1, then H is asymptotically provable conditioned on G. These
developments have been guided by and applied to the case of spacetime re-
gions.
There are a series of consequences that can be derived from this proposal.
The first is that Bayesian methods can extend the subset of the hypothesis
space for which mathematically rigorous assessments can be carried out. The
obtained results suggests that the space of all possible hypotheses can be
divided in the regions depicted in fig. 2.
The falsifiable subset of hypotheses is the one for which we can make the
stronger statements. It contains the hypotheses which actually make testable
predictions. Hypotheses which are conditionally asymptotic provable are not
necessarily falsifiable, although they can be. Still, one can assign probabilities
to their truth value (even if only in principle) which can asymptotically reach
certainty under the conditions we specified. Even if one cannot asymptotically
prove a hypotheses, we showed that one can still use probabilistic inference
to assess them in a meaningful way in most cases. Such hypotheses, including
those which fall outside the previous two regions, we call Bayesian accessible.
Whether or not there is any hypothesis outside the Bayesian accessible set
remains an unanswered question which will not be addressed here.
The existence of isolated regions which are not falsifiable is not a demon-
stration that scientific reasoning based on the falsifiability criteria should be
abandoned. It is rather an example of the limitations of the concept of falsi-
fiability when applied to a plausible physical model. It is important to notice
that falsifiability is a condition of utmost importance to differentiate scientific
knowledge from pseudo-science (or from superstition and religion).
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Fig. 2 Hypothesis space. Each circle delimits a subset of hypotheses according to the pos-
sibility of evaluating their truth values.
We want to stress that the results we got depend heavily on our assumed
hypotheses. For instance, if absolute existence cannot be meaningfully defined,
i.e., if there is no way to formulate a mathematical function E that gives
an absolute notion of existence, then the isolated world problem is ill-posed.
One can view such a discussion as related that of reality. This problem is
particularly subtle in quantum theory. Discussions about whether there are
levels of reality [4,23] show that the question is still not settled.
Another point that should be questioned is the existence of the conditional
link between a falsifiable and a not falsifiable hypothesis. It seems that this
link is simply equivalent to the assertion that the property should be valid
everywhere and, therefore, is a falsifiable hypothesis. This is hardly a rigorous
proof though and we leave the possibility open.
Finally, we have to leave very clear the fact that the statements about
asymptotic provability are valid as limits. It is true that, in order to exactly
quantify the probability of a hypothesis being true one would need the exact
value of PE|H(A|F ), which as discussed before is only possible if one knows all
alternative theories.
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A Asymptotic Provability Limit
Consider equation (6). Let us us define, for convenience, PH (T ) = xt, PH|E (T |B) = xt+1
and PE|H (B|F ) = β. Then, the Bayesian update xt → xt+1 is given by
xt+1 =
xt
β(1 − xt) + xt
. (14)
Suppose that the expression
xn =
x0
βk(1 − x0) + x0
, (15)
is true for some time n with k being an integer. Then
xn+1 =
xn
β(1 − xn) + xn
=
x0
βk(1 − x0) + x0
1
β
(
1− x0
βk(1−x0)+x0
)
+ x0
βk(1−x0)+x0
=
x0
βk(1 − x0) + x0
βk(1− x0) + x0
β
(
βk(1− x0) + x0 − x0
)
+ x0
=
x0
βk+1(1 − x0) + x0
.
(16)
But expression (15) is indeed valid for n = k = 1 and, therefore, this proves that
xt =
x0
βt(1− x0) + x0
, (17)
for any time t. Finally, the second falsifiability condition implies β < 1, which then results
in
lim
t→∞
xt = 1, (18)
in the case when only the result B keeps being measured as long as x0 6= 0, which we assume
true a priori. This proves in a more direct way that the certainty about the truth of the
hypothesis H increases asymptotically to 1 if its predictions continue to be confirmed.
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